PRIVACY Forum Archive Document
PRIVACY Forum Digest Thursday, 27 May 1993 Volume 02 : Issue 18 Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (email@example.com) Vortex Technology, Topanga, CA, U.S.A. ===== PRIVACY FORUM ===== The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy. ************************************************** * * * PRIVACY Forum One Year Anniversary Issue * * * ************************************************** CONTENTS PRIVACY Brief (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator) Library of Congress Information System now on Internet (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator) Can Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective? (Robin Hanson) Electronic fingerprinting of welfare recipients in CA (James I. Davis) ComSec in Australia [Roger] (Klaus Brunnstein) NIST Answers to Jim Bidzos' Questions (Jim Bidzos) Data Protection Agency created in Spain (Rafael Fernandez Calvo) Calif requires ID? (Bruce Jones) *** Please include a RELEVANT "Subject:" line on all submissions! *** *** Submissions without them may be ignored! *** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Internet PRIVACY Forum is a moderated digest for the discussion and analysis of issues relating to the general topic of privacy (both personal and collective) in the "information age" of the 1990's and beyond. The moderator will choose submissions for inclusion based on their relevance and content. Submissions will not be routinely acknowledged. ALL submissions should be addressed to "firstname.lastname@example.org" and must have RELEVANT "Subject:" lines; submissions without appropriate and relevant "Subject:" lines may be ignored. Excessive "signatures" on submissions are subject to editing. Subscriptions are by an automatic "listserv" system; for subscription information, please send a message consisting of the word "help" (quotes not included) in the BODY of a message to: "email@example.com". Mailing list problems should be reported to "firstname.lastname@example.org". All submissions included in this digest represent the views of the individual authors and all submissions will be considered to be distributable without limitations. The PRIVACY Forum archive, including all issues of the digest and all related materials, is available via anonymous FTP from site "ftp ftp.vortex.com", in the "/privacy" directory. Use the FTP login "ftp" or "anonymous", and enter your e-mail address as the password. The typical "README" and "INDEX" files are available to guide you through the files available for FTP access. PRIVACY Forum materials may also be obtained automatically via e-mail through the listserv system. Please follow the instructions above for getting the listserv "help" information, which includes details regarding the "index" and "get" listserv commands, which are used to access the PRIVACY Forum archive. All PRIVACY Forum materials are also available through the Internet Gopher system via a gopher server on site "gopher.vortex.com/". For information regarding the availability of this digest via FAX, please send an inquiry to email@example.com, call (310) 455-9300, or FAX to (310) 455-2364. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- VOLUME 02, ISSUE 18 Quote for the day: "This paper is 100% unrecycled. Whole forests were leveled, thousands of small furry animals left homeless, and vast virgin landscapes devastated, to make this book." -- From the last page of "Science Made Stupid" by Tom Weller (1985) [ I strongly recommend this book! -- MODERATOR ] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- PRIVACY Brief (from the Moderator) --- A New York State Federal Judge has ruled against the federal anti-autodialing-solicitation law, which would have banned most autodialer solicitation machines. The decision was apparently based on free-speech grounds, and also related to concerns that certain non-commercial uses of autodialer solicitation units were exempted under the law. The ultimate impact of this ruling is unclear at this time. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 27 May 93 11:30 PDT From: firstname.lastname@example.org (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator) Subject: Library of Congress Information System now on Internet Greetings. As of around May 1, the U.S. Library of Congress is accessible over the Internet. Not only is collection catalog searching available, but (of potential particular interest to PRIVACY Forum readers) access to the Congressional legislation tracking system, including both past and current sessions of Congress, is also included. You can search for legislation in a variety of manners, including keywords, and you can determine where new proposed legislation currently stands in the legislative process. The hostname for telnet access is "locis.loc.gov/". Their FTP server is "seq1.loc.gov/". Note that (at this time) telnet access is generally only available during the hours that the Library is physically open to the public. --Lauren-- ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 26 May 93 10:46:32 PDT From: Robin Hanson <email@example.com> Subject: Can Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective? U.S. Phone companies spend more than 4000 times as much running the phone system (~$138b) as U.S. police spend on legal domestic phone wiretaps ($30m), to listen to phone conversations without the consent of either party. So even if wiretaps are worth several times what police spend on them, and even if spy agencies spend a similar amount on wiretaps, we can justify only the slightest modification of our phone system to accommodate wiretaps. Yet the new wiretap chip, and last year's FBI digital telephony bill, both threaten to raise our phone bills by far more than they reduce our taxes for police. Dorothy Denning claims that wiretaps are worth "billions of dollars per year", based on amounts fined, recovered, etc. But this is just the wrong way to estimate the value of police services, according to standard texts on law enforcement economics. Instead, the value of each wiretap should be not far from how much police (or spies) would be willing to pay extra for that wiretap. Given alternatives to use hidden microphones, informants, offer immunity, investigate someone else, or to decriminalize or raise the punishment for some crimes, it seems hard to imagine police would on average be willing to pay four times as much as they do now. Even then, the option to wiretap the average phone line would be worth only twelve cents a month. Yet phone companies must perceive substantial costs to supporting wiretaps, even relative to wanting to stay on the good side of police; why else would police be complaining about lack of support? Government policies attempting to preserve wiretaps in the face of technological change would discourage a full global market for phone systems, while government decree would displace marketplace evolution of standards for representing, encrypting, and exchanging voice. Do you think these factors would raise the average $78 monthly phone bill by more than twelve cents? Even the wiretap chip itself, sold for $26 each while private chips without wiretap support sell for $10, would cost people who buy a new phone every five years an extra 27 cents per month. And FBI estimates of phone company costs to develop new software to support wiretaps suggest software costs alone could be over $6 per phone line. The central question is this: would police agencies still be willing to pay for each wiretap, if each wiretapping agency were charged its share of the full cost, to phone users, of forcing phones to support wiretaps? And why not let the market decide the answer? Currently, police must pay phone company "expenses" to support wiretaps. So why not let phone companies sell police the option to perform legal wiretaps on given sets of phone lines, at whatever price the two parties can negotiate? Phone companies could then offer discounts to customers who use phones with wiretap chips, and each person could decide if the extra cost and risk of privacy invasion was worth the price to make life easier for the police. Or why not increase the punishment for crimes committed using wiretap-avoiding technology? If it turns out wiretaps aren't worth their cost, so be it. Less than one part in 1000 of police budgets are spent on wiretaps, and wiretaps weren't even legal before 1968. Robin Hanson firstname.lastname@example.org 415-604-3361 MS-269-2, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA 94035 510-651-7483 47164 Male Terrace, Fremont, CA 94539-7921 [ A longer version of this paper (approx. 24K bytes) is available in the PRIVACY Forum archives. To access: Via Anon FTP: From site "ftp ftp.vortex.com": /privacy/wiretap-cost.Z or: /privacy/wiretap-cost Via e-mail: Send mail to "email@example.com" with the line: get privacy wiretap-cost as the first text in the BODY of your message. Via gopher: From the gopher server on site "gopher.vortex.com/" in the "*** PRIVACY Forum ***" area under "wiretap-cost". -- MODERATOR ] ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 23 May 1993 11:33:44 -0700 From: "James I. Davis" <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: Electronic fingerprinting of welfare recipients in CA I spoke on Thursday (5/13) at a hearing before the San Francisco Social Services Commission regarding their plan to begin requiring that welfare recipients submit to electronic fingerprinting as a condition of receiving public assistance. I am sending out a copy of my remarks (it's a rather long posting) under "separate cover." Here is some background information on the issue: I collected most of the data contained in my remarks from interviews with various people, and some memos and press releases from various agencies. I understand that there is a small piece in a recent _Mother Jones_ about the experience in LA, which supports the points I made in my remarks. I have a more pointed piece in the CPSR/Berkeley newsletter if you are interested. In June of 1991, Los Angeles County began requiring electronic fingerprints as a condition of receiving General Assistance (GA). GA is a state-mandated, county administered program for indigent adults. The system is ostensibly designed to deter people from receiving benefits under multiple names, although their are many aspects of the system that could bear more serious scrutiny than it has received to date. LA is spending some $9.4 million over five years on the Automated Fingerprint Image Reporting and Match System (AFIRM), AFIRM was developed by computer services giant Electronic Data Systems. In February of this year, Alameda County started using the system, at an estimated cost of $1.3 million. San Francisco is currently considering adopting the system. The Department of Social Services says it will cost $1 million to implement, but I think that is low. The AFIRM proposal was approved by the SF Social Services Commission on May 13, and the matter now goes to the SF Board of Supervisors, who must approve a change in the ordinance governing GA, to include the fingerprinting requirement. The next step will be a hearing before one or more committees (perhaps Willie Kennedy's on social policy, and/or the finance committee), most likely in early June. Any suggestions for questions about the system will be very helpful, especially questions about technical, privacy and security issues. It is clear that SF plans to link the system up with other counties and share data with them regularly. Also if you have any expertise on fingerprinting and law enforcement, I need some info on that. The AFIRM system only makes sense if it is installed on as wide a basis, and for as many public assistance programs as possible. On the other hand, the more counties that refuse to participate, the less likely it will be to take root. I think that there is an opportunity to stop it at the SF Board of Supervisors... Jim D. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 09:22:00 EDT From: email@example.com.UNI-HAMBURG.DBP.DE Subject: Re: ComSec in Australia [Roger] ----------------------------Original message---------------------------- Roger, friends, as a follow-up to Roger's message to a distinguished list and to Risk Forum, I append a message which gives some background of the technology applied. I've some details of the technical details (some only in Germany :-). Greetings from Hamburg, site of IFIP World Congress 1994 Klaus Brunnstein ================== Delivery-date: Monday, May 3, 1993 at 18:27 GMT+0100 From:<S=brunnstein;OU=rz;OU=informatik;P=uni-hamburg;A=dbp;C=de> To:Risk Forum <S=risks;OU=csl;O=sri;P=com;A=dbp;C=de> [confirm] Subject:Mobile ComSec in Europe (A5) Stimulated by the "Cripple Clipper" Chip discussions, I invested some time to investigate the European approach in this area. Mobile communication security is practically available, since some time, in Western Europe based on some technology which will now alsp be applied in Australia [see Roger Clarke: Risk Forum 14.56). In contacts with people from producers, carriers and Telecom research, I collected the following facts: - Dominated by Western European telecommunications enterprises, a CCITT subsidiary (CEPT=Conference Europeenne des Administrations des Postes et des Telecommunications; founded 1959, presently 26 European countries, mainly from Western/Northern Europe) formed a subgroup (ETSI=European Telecommunications Standards Institute) which specified, in a special Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) the GSM standard (=Groupe Special Mobile). Presently, ETSI (planned as EEC's Standardisation Institute in this area) has 250 members from industry (63%), carrier (14%), government (10%), appliers and research (together 10%). Research here means essentially Telecom and related "research" institutes. - GSM documents specify roughly the functional characteristics including secure encryption of transmitted digital messages (see "European digital cellular telecommunication system (phase 2): Security Related Network Functions"). Apart from protocols, details of algorithms are secret. - GSM contains 3 secret algorithms (only given to experts with established need-to-know, esp. carriers or manufacturers): Algorithm A3: Authentication algorithm, Algorithm A8: Cipher Key Generator (essentially a 1-way function), and Algorithm A5: Ciphering/Deciphering algorithm (presently A5/1,A5/2). Used in proper sequence, this set of algorithms shall guarantee that NOBODY can break the encrypted communication. - Mobile stations are equipped with a chipcard containing A3 and A8, plus an ASIC containing A5; the (non-mobile) base stations (from where the communication flows into the land-based lines) is equipped with an ASIC realising A5 encryption, and it is connected with an "authentication center" using (ASIC, potentially software based) A3 and A8 algorithms to authenticate the mobile participant and generate a session key. - When a secure communication is started (with the chipcard inserted in the mobile station), authentication of the mobile participant is perfor- med by encrypting the individual subscriber key Ki (and some random seed exchanged between the mobile and base station) with A3 and sending this to the base station where it is checked against the stored identity. Length of Ki: 128 bit. - If authentified, the individual subscriber key Ki (plus some random seed exchanged between mobile and basis station) is used to generate a session key Kc; length of Kc: 64 bit. Different from Clipper, a session key may be used for more than one session, dependent on the setting of a flag at generation time; evidently, this feature allows to minimize communication delays from the authentication process. - Using session key (Kc), the data stream (e.g. digitized voice) is en- crypted using the A5 algorithm and properly decrypted at base station. - A more complex authentication procedure including exchange of IMSI (In- ternational Mobile Subscriber Identity) may be used to authenticate the subscriber and at the same time to generate the session key (using an combined "A38" algorithm) and transmit it back to the mobile station. Comparing the European A5 approach with US' "Cripple Clipper Chip", I find some surprising basic similarities (apart from minor technical differences, such as key lengths and using ASICs only versus Chipcard in the mobile station): 1) Both approaches apply the "SbO Principle" (Security by Obscurity): "what outsiders don't know, is secure!" Or formulated differently: only insiders can know whether it contains built-in trapdoors or whether it is really secure! 2) Both approaches aim at protecting their hemisphere (in the European case, including some interest spheres such as "down-under", to serve the distinguished British taste:-) from other hemispheres' competition. The most significant differences are: A) that US government tries to masquerade the economic arguments with some legalistic phrases ("protect citizen's privacy AND protect them against criminal misuse") whereas Western Europeans must not argue as everybody knows the dominance of EEC's economic arguments (and the sad situation of privacy in most EEC countries :-) B) that US government must produce the rather complex "escrow agencies" where European law enforcers must only deal with ETSI (manufacturers and carriers!) about reduced safety in "A5/n" algorithms (n=1,2,...). Presently, different "A5/n" algorithms are discussed. Apart from the "secure" original algorithm A5 (now labeled A5/1), a "less secure, export oriented A5/2" has been specified (according to my source which may not be fully informed, this will go to "down-under" :-). One argument for such "A5/n" multiplicity is that availability of more A5/n algorithms may even allow to select, during authentication, one algorithm from the set thus improving security of communi- cation; at the same time, as these algorithms are secret, the secret automatic selection (e.g. triggered by some obscure function similar to the random ex- change in the authentication process) may allow to crack the encryted message. My (contemporary) conclusion is that security of both A5 and CC is questionable as long as their security cannot be assessed by independent experts. In both cases, economic interests seem to play a dominant role; there are clear indica- tions of forthcoming economic "competition", and I wonder which side Japan will take (maybe they decide to start their own crippled SecureCom standard?) Klaus Brunnstein (Univ Hamburg; May 3, 1993) ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 17 May 93 14:05:18 PDT From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) Subject: NIST Answers to Jim Bidzos' Questions [ From RISKS-FORUM Digest 14.62 -- MODERATOR ] Date: Mon, 17 May 1993 16:44:28 -0400 (EDT) From: ROBACK@ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV Subject: Answers to Your Questions To: jim@RSA.COM To: Mr. Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security, Inc. From: Ed Roback, NIST Mr. Ray Kammer asked me to forward to you our answers to the questions you raised in your e-mail of 4/27. We've inserted our answers in your original message. ------------------------------------------------------ From: SMTP%"jim@RSA.COM" 27-APR-1993 03:13:12.75 To: firstname.lastname@example.org CC: Subj: Clipper questions ... Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 00:11:50 PDT From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) Here are some questions about the Clipper program I would like to submit. Much has been said about Clipper and Capstone (the term Clipper will be used to describe both) recently. Essentially, Clipper is a government-sponsored tamper-resistant chip that employs a classified algorithm and a key escrow facility that allows law enforcement, with the cooperation of two other parties, to decipher Clipper-encrypted traffic. The stated purpose of the program is to offer telecommunications privacy to individuals, businesses, and government, while protecting the ability of law enforcement to conduct court-authorized wiretapping. The announcement said, among other things, that there is currently no plan to attempt to legislate Clipper as the only legal means to protect telecommunications. Many have speculated that Clipper, since it is only effective in achieving its stated objectives if everyone uses it, will be followed by legislative attempts to make it the only legal telecommunications protection allowed. This remains to be seen. >>>> NIST: There are no current plans to legislate the use of Clipper. Clipper will be a government standard, which can be - and likely will be - used voluntarily by the private sector. The option for legislation may be examined during the policy review ordered by the President. The proposal, taken at face value, still raises a number of serious questions. What is the smallest number of people who are in a position to compromise the security of the system? This would include people employed at a number of places such as Mikotronyx, VSLI, NSA, FBI, and at the trustee facilities. Is there an available study on the cost and security risks of the escrow process? >>>> NIST: It will not be possible for anyone from Mykotronx, VLSI, NIST, NSA, FBI (or any other non-escrow holder) to compromise the system. Under current plans, it would be necessary for three persons, one from each of the escrow trustees and one who knows the serial number of the Clipper Chip which is the subject of the court authorized electronic intercept by the outside law enforcement agency, to conspire in order to compromise escrowed keys. To prevent this, it is envisioned that every time a law enforcement agency is provided access to the escrowed keys there will be a record of same referencing the specific lawful intercept authorization (court order). Audits will be performed to assure strict compliance. This duplicates the protection afforded nuclear release codes. If additional escrow agents are added, one additional person from each would be required to compromise the system. NSA's analysis on the security risks of the escrow system is not available for public dissemination. How were the vendors participating in the program chosen? Was the process open? >>>> NIST: The services of the current chip vendors were obtained in accordance with U.S. Government rules for sole source procurement, based on unique capabilities they presented. Criteria for selecting additional sources will be forthcoming over the next few months. AT&T worked with the government on a voluntary basis to use the "Clipper Chip" in their Telephone Security Device. Any vendors of equipment who would like to use the chips in their equipment may do so, provided they meet proper government security requirements. A significant percentage of US companies are or have been the subject of an investigation by the FBI, IRS, SEC, EPA, FTC, and other government agencies. Since records are routinely subpoenaed, shouldn't these companies now assume that all their communications are likely compromised if they find themselves the subject of an investigation by a government agency? If not, why not? >>>> NIST: No. First of all, there is strict and limited use of subpoenaed material under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and sanctions for violation. There has been no evidence to date of Governmental abuse of subpoenaed material, be it encrypted or not. Beyond this, other Federal criminal and civil statutes protect and restrict the disclosure of proprietary business information, trade secrets, etc. Finally, of all the Federal agencies cited, only the FBI has statutory authority to conduct authorized electronic surveillance. Electronic surveillance is conducted by the FBI only after a Federal judge agrees that there is probable cause indicating that a specific individual or individuals are using communications in furtherance of serious criminal activity and issues a court order to the FBI authorizing the interception of the communications. What companies or individuals in industry were consulted (as stated in the announcement) on this program prior to its announcement? (This question seeks to identify those who may have been involved at the policy level; certainly ATT, Mikotronyx and VLSI are part of industry, and surely they were involved in some way.) >>>> NIST: To the best of our knowledge: AT&T, Mykotronx, VLSI, and Motorola. Other firms were briefed on the project, but not "consulted," per se. Is there a study available that estimates the cost to the US government of the Clipper program? >>>> NIST: No studies have been conducted on a government-wide basis to estimate the costs of telecommunications security technologies. The needs for such protection are changing all the time. There are a number of companies that employ non-escrowed cryptography in their products today. These products range from secure voice, data, and fax to secure email, electronic forms, and software distribution, to name but a few. With over a million such products in use today, what does the Clipper program envision for the future of these products and the many corporations and individuals that have invested in and use them? Will the investment made by the vendors in encryption-enhanced products be protected? If so, how? Is it envisioned that they will add escrow features to their products or be asked to employ Clipper? >>>> NIST: Again, the Clipper Chip is a government standard which can be used voluntarily by those in the private sector. We also point out that the President's directive on "Public Encryption Management" stated: "In making this decision, I do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key-escrow system." You will have to consult directly with private firms as to whether they will add escrow features to their products. Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in software, what options are available to those who can benefit from cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on these vendors or of the potential cost to the software industry conducted? (Much of the use of cryptography by software companies, particularly those in the entertainment industry, is for the protection of their intellectual property.) >>>> NIST: You are correct that, currently, Clipper Chip functionality can only be implemented in hardware. We are not aware of a solution to allow lawfully authorized government access when the key escrow features and encryption algorithm are implemented in software. We would welcome the participation of the software industry in a cooperative effort to meet this technical challenge. Existing software encryption use can, of course, continue. Banking and finance (as well as general commerce) are truly global today. Most European financial institutions use technology described in standards such as ISO 9796. Many innovative new financial products and services will employ the reversible cryptography described in these standards. Clipper does not comply with these standards. Will US financial institutions be able to export Clipper? If so, will their overseas customers find Clipper acceptable? Was a study of the potential impact of Clipper on US competitiveness conducted? If so, is it available? If not, why not? >>>> NIST: Consistent with current export regulations applied to the export of the DES, we expect U.S. financial institutions will be able to export the Clipper Chip on a case by case basis for their use. It is probably too early to ascertain how desirable their overseas customers will find the Clipper Chip. No formal study of the impact of the Clipper Chip has been conducted since it was, until recently, a classified technology; however, we are well aware of the threats from economic espionage from foreign firms and governments and we are making the Clipper Chip available to provide excellent protection against these threats. As noted below, we would be interested in such input from potential users and others affected by the announcement. Use of other encryption techniques and standards, including ISO 9796 and the ISO 8730 series, by non-U.S. Government entities (such as European financial institutions) is expected to continue. I realize they are probably still trying to assess the impact of Clipper, but it would be interesting to hear from some major US financial institutions on this issue. >>>> NIST: We too would be interested in hearing any reaction from these institutions, particularly if such input can be received by the end of May, to be used in the Presidentially-directed review of government cryptographic policy. Did the administration ask these questions (and get acceptable answers) before supporting this program? If so, can they share the answers with us? If not, can we seek answers before the program is launched? >>>> NIST: These and many, many others were discussed during the development of the Clipper Chip key escrow technology and the decisions-making process. The decisions reflect those discussions and offer a balance among the various needs of corporations and citizens for improved security and privacy and of the law enforcement community for continued legal access to the communications of criminals. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 16 May 93 21:01:10 -0100 From: email@example.com (Rafael Fernandez Calvo) Subject: Data Protection Agency created in Spain CCCCC LL II CC LL II CC LL II -- N E W S FROM S P A I N --- May 16, 1993 CCCCC LLLLLL II COMMISSION for LIBERTIES and INFORMATICS (*) DATA PROTECTION AGENCY CREATED BY THE SPANISH COVERNMENT -------------------------------------------------------- The Government of the Kingdom of Spain approved on May 4th, 1993 the Estatute of the Data Protection Agency (Agencia de Proteccion de Datos), the body that, according to the Law on Protection of Personal Data (whose acronym is LORTAD) approved by the Spanish Parliament in October 1992, will watch over proper observance of this law. According to its Estatute, the Agency is an independent body, headed by its Director, who will be nominated by the Government among the members of the Consultive Council. The Council will have nine members, elected for a period of four years by the Congress, the Senate, the Ministry of Justice, the Regional Governments, the Federation of Provinces and Cities, the Royal Academy of History, the Council of Universities, the Council of Consumers and Users, and the Council of Chambers of Commerce, respectively. Trade Unions and DP Professionals will not be represented in spite of the proposals of CLI, that also submitted one of having the Director nominated by the Council itself instead of by the Government in order to insure the independence of the Agency Among the powers of the Agency are those of dictating fines of up to 1 Million US $ and sealing personal data files of companies and entities that infringe the law. The Agency will the body representing Spain in the European Community, the Council of Europe and the Schengen Agreement on free circulation of people within the EC borders for all the matters regarding personal data protection. The Data Protection Agency will have to be created in the middle of a sharp campaign for Congress and Parliament in elections that will be held on June 6, whose outcome, according to the polls, will be very tight between the ruling Socialist Party and the center-right People's Party, with a well placed third party: United Left (a communist-led coalition). These two parties gave strong support to the position of CLI with regard to the LORTAD during its discussion in Congress and Senate. CLI achieved in February its goal of seeing the appeal against the Personal Data Law put before the Constitutional Court of Spain by the Ombudsman, the Peoples' Party and the Regional Parliament of Catalonia. The appeals address basically the concerns of CLI that the law establishes a lot of unjustified exceptions in favour of Government with regard to the rights that citizens have about their personal data. Even though the appeals don't interrupt the application of the law since Jan. 31, they leave the door open to its modification in the sense promoted by CLI. Let's recall that Spain is one of the very few countries whose Carta Magna foresees the dangers that can stem from misuse of Information Technology. In fact, its Constitution establishes that a "law will limit the use of Information Technologies in order to protect citizens' honour and their personal and family privacy as well as the unrestricted exercise of their rights" (article 18.4). The position of CLI about the LORTAD can be summarized as follows: - The law does not fulfill the expectations arisen, although it is a step forward in comparison with the current situation of "allegality" that has been a constant source of severe abuse against privacy. - The good side of the law is the regulation of personal data files in the hands of companies and private entities. Citizens will have wide rights to access, modification and cancellation of this kind of records. - The bad side stems from the following facts: a) The bill gives excessive and uncontrolled power to Policy Forces over collection and computerization of highly sensitive data: ideology, religion, beliefs, racial origin, health and sexual orientation. b) Computerized personal data records in the hands of all branches of Public Administrations will be in many cases excluded from the rights (access, modification, cancellation) given to citizens with regard to the same kind of data in the hands of private companies. c) The Data Protection Agency that will watch over proper observance of the law will have scarce autonomy from the Government, that will nominate and dismiss its Director. * SOME WORDS ABOUT CLI The --Commission for Liberties and Informatics, CLI-- is an independent and pluralistic organization that was officially constituted in April '91. Its mission is to "promote the development and protection of citizens' rights, specially privacy, against misuse of Information Technologies". As of May '93, CLI is composed by nine organizations, with a joint membership of about 3,000,000 people. They cover a very wide spectrum of social interest groups: associations of computer professionals, judges, civil rights leagues, trade unions, consumers groups, direct marketing industry, etc. CLI is confederated with similar bodies created in some other Spanish Regions such as Valencia, Basque Country and Catalonia, and has fluid working relationships with many public and private Data Protection bodies and entities all over the world, including CNIL, CPSR and Privacy International. CLI has its headquarters in: Padilla 66, 3 dcha. E-28006 Madrid, Spain Phone: (34-1) 402 9391 Fax: (34-1) 309 3685 E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 14 May 1993 08:04:11 -0700 From: email@example.com (Bruce Jones) Subject: Calif requires ID? A couple of nights ago on the local TV news I heard that California now requires that all adults carry identification at all times. Can anyone offer any pointers to more information on this subject? Bruce Jones - firstname.lastname@example.org [ I have never heard of such a requirement here in California! If anyone knows otherwise on this topic, we'd like to hear about it! -- MODERATOR ] ------------------------------ End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 02.18 ************************
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