PRIVACY Forum Archive Document
PRIVACY Forum Digest Sunday, 13 June 1993 Volume 02 : Issue 20 Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (email@example.com) Vortex Technology, Topanga, CA, U.S.A. ===== PRIVACY FORUM ===== The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy. CONTENTS The other side of Clipper (A. Padgett Peterson) Traffic analysis (Mathew Lodge) NIST CSSPAB 6/4/93 Resolutions (Dave Banisar) CLI News from Spain - June 7, 1993 (Rafael Fernandez Calvo) USPS NCOA request results (Steve Peterson) CPSR Clipper Testimony 6/9 (Dave Banisar) *** Please include a RELEVANT "Subject:" line on all submissions! *** *** Submissions without them may be ignored! *** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Internet PRIVACY Forum is a moderated digest for the discussion and analysis of issues relating to the general topic of privacy (both personal and collective) in the "information age" of the 1990's and beyond. The moderator will choose submissions for inclusion based on their relevance and content. Submissions will not be routinely acknowledged. ALL submissions should be addressed to "firstname.lastname@example.org" and must have RELEVANT "Subject:" lines; submissions without appropriate and relevant "Subject:" lines may be ignored. Excessive "signatures" on submissions are subject to editing. Subscriptions are by an automatic "listserv" system; for subscription information, please send a message consisting of the word "help" (quotes not included) in the BODY of a message to: "email@example.com". Mailing list problems should be reported to "firstname.lastname@example.org". All submissions included in this digest represent the views of the individual authors and all submissions will be considered to be distributable without limitations. The PRIVACY Forum archive, including all issues of the digest and all related materials, is available via anonymous FTP from site "ftp ftp.vortex.com", in the "/privacy" directory. Use the FTP login "ftp" or "anonymous", and enter your e-mail address as the password. The typical "README" and "INDEX" files are available to guide you through the files available for FTP access. PRIVACY Forum materials may also be obtained automatically via e-mail through the listserv system. Please follow the instructions above for getting the listserv "help" information, which includes details regarding the "index" and "get" listserv commands, which are used to access the PRIVACY Forum archive. All PRIVACY Forum materials are also available through the Internet Gopher system via a gopher server on site "gopher.vortex.com/". For information regarding the availability of this digest via FAX, please send an inquiry to email@example.com, call (310) 455-9300, or FAX to (310) 455-2364. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- VOLUME 02, ISSUE 20 Quote for the day: "The life so short, the craft so long to learn." -- Hippocrates, 5th century B.C. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 09:05:30 -0400 From: firstname.lastname@example.org (A. Padgett Peterson,P.E. Information Security - - (407)826-1101) Subject: The other side of Clipper As apparently the sole individual to see a positive side of Clipper, I would like to comment that this is not so much an evolution of cryptographc practise as a revolution and requires a different mindset. First, I believe that the tapping capability of Clipper/Capstone will prevent its ever replacing STU-IIIs and other complex algoritms for dedicated point-point connections that require absolute privacy. Legislation from the government banning "any other cryptography" would be impossible to enforce and akin to trying to stuff knowlege back into Pandora's box. It is just not going to be happen and the government is intelligent enough not to take on a losing battle that could just flood the legal system (and there would be pleanty of floodees). Next, what Capstone represents is a new kind of crypto that the miliary has enjoyed for years. Anytime, anywhere, to anyone. No complex and archane key management, no prearranged signals, the key management appears to be able to be handled intermally including session ignition. That I do not understand how this is done does not mean that it isn't (and if you read the 30 April Capstone document you will find the words "A Key Exchange Algorithm based on a public key exchange."). Finally, it has been said that "business will not accept Clipper/Capstone". Hogwash. The bulk of American business could care less if the government can tap their communications that are being sent in the clear today anyway ! What American business wants is freedom from "due care" lawsuits, hackers, and competitors. To a hospital transmitting X-Rays over phone lines, it is the patient's lawyer that concerns the hospital, not the government's. IMHO the tap capability is necessary for American business to embrace Clipper/Capstone so long as their security department can also do so. Since we are now talking "owner's rights", I believe this will happen and will not require a court order. Already the precidents are being set in the California E-Mail monitoring cases. Certainly maintaining this right will require the ability for the owner to monitor such transmissions or accountability will be lost. As a result, I believe that Clipper/Capstone is going to change how we think about telecommunications and that the current arguments against Clipper will turn out to be its greatest strengths. Warmly (94 today), Padgett (usual disclaimers apply) ps IMHO the "problem" with key management is already solved & is just a diversionary smokescreen. All of the facts have not been released. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 15:10:32 From: email@example.com Subject: Traffic analysis In V02 #19, Burton Strauss writes: > Date: Fri, 28 May 1993 23:49:10 -0400 (EDT) > From: bstrauss@BIX.com > Subject: Clipper Chip [stuff deleted] > ... I wonder if the government really > thinks they can manage the flow. Even if there is a backdoor in clipper and > they can crack, trivially, every conversation 'they' want, how does the > government (nefarious FBI, NSA, etc people) expect to sift the 'interesting' > things from the sheer volume? > > One of the key military technologies is traffic analysis -- even if you > can't read the meaning, a sudden increase in traffic is an indication that > 'something' is up. But there is 999 or 1000 messages per day, and nothing > to set off a traffic alert. This has long been a recognised problem, and is easily solved by continuous transmission of information. You continuously transmit a stream of data (usually randomly generated). When you want to transmit a real message, you insert it into the random data stream. This raises the problem of how to identify the real messages from the rubbish -- prefixing a code or keywork leaves the data stream open to attack by a good cryptanalyist, who is looking for just such a repeated item. (see the sci.crypt FAQ for more on this sort of attack) It has long been known that the British Government's GCHQ (Government Communications Head Quarters) is continually working on various systems that try to identify "interesting" messages in the mass of information that they receive. I imagine the NSA in the USA does the same (since it is reputed to be the largest employer of mathematicians and purchaser of computer equipment in the world, I imagine it's quite good at it.) There's a nice discussion about the problems of information transmission in Nelson DeMille's novel "The Talbot Odyssey" It also has a nice nightmare scenario for the wiping out of all electronic devices in the USA that might interest PRIVACY readers. Mat | Mathew Lodge | "What's your name, boy?" "Kate." "Isn't that | | firstname.lastname@example.org | a bit of a girl's name?" "It's short for... | | University of York, UK | Bob." -- Blackadder II | ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 4 Jun 1993 20:46:59 EST From: Dave Banisar <email@example.com> Subject: NIST CSSPAB 6/4/93 Resolutions NIST Crypto Resolutions Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board June 4, 1993 Resolution #1 At Mr. Kammer's request we have conducted two days of hearings. The clear message of the majority of input was that there are serious concerns regarding the Key Escrow Initiative and the Board concurs with these concerns. Many of these issues are still to be fully understood and more time is needed to achieving that understanding. Accordingly, this Board resolves to have an additional meeting in July 1993 in order to more completely respond to Mr. Kammer's request and to fulfill its statutory obligations under P.L. 100-235. The Board recommends that the inter-agency review take note of our input collected, our preliminary finding, and adjust the timetable to allow for resolution of the significant issues and problems raised. Attached to this resolution is a preliminary distillation of the serious concerns and problems. Resolution #2 Key escrowing encryption technology represents a dramatic change in the nation's information infrastructure. The full implications of this encryption technique are not fully understood at this time. Therefore, the Board recommends that key escrowing encryption technology not be deployed beyond current implementations planned within the Executive Branch, until the significant public policy and technical issues inherent with this encryption technique are fully understood. [Attachment to Resolution #1]] - A convincing statement of the problem that Clipper attempts to solve has not been provided. - Export and important controls over cryptographic products must be reviewed. Based upon data compiled from U.S. and international vendors, current controls are negatively impacting U.S. competitiveness in the world market and are not inhibiting the foreign production and use of cryptography (DES and RSA) - The Clipper/Capstone proposal does not address the needs of the software industry, which is a critical and significant component of the National Information Infrastructure and the U.S. economy. - Additional DES encryption alternatives and key management alternatives should be considered since there is a significant installed base. - The individuals reviewing the Skipjack algorithm and key management system must be given an appropriate time period and environment in which to perform a thorough review. This review must address the escrow protocol and chip implementation as well as the algorithm itself. - Sufficient information must be provided on the proposed key escrow scheme to allow it to be fully understood by the general public. It does not appear to be clearly defined at this time and, since it is an integral part of the security of the system, it appears to require further development and consideration of alternatives to the key escrow scheme (e.g., three "escrow" entities, one of which is a non-government agency, and a software based solution). - The economic implications for the Clipper/Capstone proposal have not been examined. These costs go beyond the vendor cost of the chip and include such factors as customer installation, maintenance, administration, chip replacement, integration and interfacing, government escrow systems costs, etc. - Legal issues raised by the proposal must be reviewed. - Congress, as well as the Administration, should play a role in the conduct and approval of the results of the review. ======================================================= NIST Resolutions on Key Escow Issues and Clipper provided by CPSR Washington office 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 303 Washington, DC 20003 firstname.lastname@example.org ======================================================= ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 13:39:49 -0100 From: email@example.com (Rafael Fernandez Calvo) Subject: CLI News from Spain - June 7, 1993 CCCCC LL II CC LL II CC LL II -- N E W S FROM S P A I N --- June 7, 1993 CCCCC LLLLLL II COMMISSION for LIBERTIES and INFORMATICS (*) PRIVACY AND GENERAL ELECTIONS: TRICKS OF THE TRADE -------------------------------------------------- Spain held general parlamentary elections yesterday, June 6th. Regardless of the ocutcome (the ruling Socialist Party obtained again a majority of the seats), one of the parties participating in the event, "Centrist Unity-Spanish Democratic Party", was expelled of the race on June 1 by the Electoral Control Committee on the grounds that the party was actually a sham put up by a group of direct marketing pirates. Regardless of the fact that this party had no choice whatsoever of winning a single seat, it showed again one of the problems that has been plaguing citizens' privacy in Spain since 1977 (first democratic elections after forty years of dictatorship): the use for commercial purposes of the magnetic tapes containing the Election Census, provided to the parties by the Public Administration. Big parties do not seem to have participated in data smuggling practices but there is evidence that many of the companies that process the tapes provided by them are the main source of abuse against the privacy of citizens in regard to their personal data in Spain, since they duplicate and sell the tapes. This fact has been frequently dennounced by CLI (*). The recently approved Personal Data Law could help to stop these practices. * SOME WORDS ABOUT CLI The --Commission for Liberties and Informatics, CLI-- is an independent and pluralistic organization that was officially constituted in April '91. Its mission is to "promote the development and protection of citizens' rights, specially privacy, against misuse of Information Technologies". As of May '93, CLI is composed by nine organizations, with a joint membership of about 3,000,000 people. They cover a very wide spectrum of social interest groups: associations of computer professionals, judges, civil rights leagues, trade unions, consumers groups, direct marketing industry, etc. CLI is confederated with similar bodies created in some other Spanish Regions such as Valencia, Basque Country and Catalonia, and has fluid working relationships with many public and private Data Protection bodies and entities all over the world, including CNIL, CPSR and Privacy International. CLI has its headquarters in: Padilla 66, 3 dcha. E-28006 Madrid, Spain Phone: (34-1) 402 9391 Fax: (34-1) 309 3685 E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 15:38:12 CDT From: Steve Peterson <email@example.com> Subject: USPS NCOA request results In February, I sent a Privacy Act request to the US Postal Service, asking them to identify everyone who had received a copy of the change of address I had filed with them in 1990. I recently received a 2 inch thick response from the USPS. It turns out that no one made a specific request for my records at the local post office. It was not possible to identify whether others had been informed via the USPS's National Change of Address (NCOA) data base; they did, however, provide me with the complete list of everyone who requested the data base from 9/1990 to 2/1993. I don't have the time to scan in all of the months of the data base, but I scanned in January, 1993 as a recent and representative sample. My apologies in advance for any misspellings or formatting problems. OCR is good, but not perfect. I believe that the entries prefixed by "MC" are Members of Congress. -- Steve Peterson 612 851 1523 FOURTH SHIFT Corporation 7900 International Drive firstname.lastname@example.org Bloomington, MN 55425 USA [ The complete text of this message, including the USPS list, which I have slightly reformatted, is available in the PRIVACY Forum archives. To access: Via Anon FTP: From site "ftp ftp.vortex.com": /privacy/usps-addr.Z or: /privacy/usps-addr Via e-mail: Send mail to "email@example.com" with the line: get privacy usps-addr as the first text in the BODY of your message. Via gopher: From the gopher server on site "gopher.vortex.com/" in the "*** PRIVACY Forum ***" area under "usps-addr". -- MODERATOR ] ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 12 Jun 1993 12:30:38 EST From: Dave Banisar <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: CPSR Clipper Testimony 6/9 On June 9, 1993, Congressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held an oversight hearing on Rencryption and telecommunications network security. Panelists were Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, Dr. Dorothy Denning, Steven Bryen of Secure Communications, Marc Rotenberg of the CPSR Washington Office and E.R. Kerkeslager of AT&T. Congressman Markey, after hearing the testimony presented, noted that the Clipper proposal had raised an Rarched eyebrow among the whole committee and that the committee viewed the proposal skeptically. This statement was the latest indication that the Clipper proposal has not been well recieved by policy makers. Last Friday, the Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board of NIST issued two resolutions critical of the encryption plan, suggesting that further study was required and that implementation of the plan should be delayed until the review is completed. At the Third CPSR Cryptography and Privacy Conference on Monday, June 7, the Acting Director of NIST, Raymond Kammer, announced that the implementation of the proposal will be delayed and that a more comprehensive review will be undertaken. The review is due in the fall. Kammer told the Washington Post that maybe we won't continue in the direction we started out. [ The complete testimony mentioned above is now available in the PRIVACY Forum archives. To access: Via Anon FTP: From site "ftp ftp.vortex.com": /privacy/cpsr-clip.1.Z or: /privacy/cpsr-clip.1 Via e-mail: Send mail to "email@example.com" with the line: get privacy cpsr-clip.1 as the first text in the BODY of your message. Via gopher: From the gopher server on site "gopher.vortex.com/" in the "*** PRIVACY Forum ***" area under "cpsr-clip.1". -- MODERATOR ] ------------------------------ End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 02.20 ************************
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