PRIVACY Forum Archive Document
PRIVACY Forum Digest Saturday, 22 October 1994 Volume 03 : Issue 20 Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (firstname.lastname@example.org) Vortex Technology, Woodland Hills, CA, U.S.A. ===== PRIVACY FORUM ===== The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy. CONTENTS O.J. Simpson Trial Jury Questionnaires now in PRIVACY Forum Archive (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator) EFF Statement on Passage of Digital Telephony Act (Stanton McCandlish) Caller ID debate (Phil Agre) Electronic Signatures [Sears] (Jim Conforti) MCI Employee Charged in $50 Million Calling Card Fraud (Monty Solomon) Call for Participation - CFP'95 (Carey Heckman) *** Please include a RELEVANT "Subject:" line on all submissions! *** *** Submissions without them may be ignored! *** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Internet PRIVACY Forum is a moderated digest for the discussion and analysis of issues relating to the general topic of privacy (both personal and collective) in the "information age" of the 1990's and beyond. The moderator will choose submissions for inclusion based on their relevance and content. Submissions will not be routinely acknowledged. ALL submissions should be addressed to "email@example.com" and must have RELEVANT "Subject:" lines; submissions without appropriate and relevant "Subject:" lines may be ignored. Excessive "signatures" on submissions are subject to editing. Subscriptions are by an automatic "listserv" system; for subscription information, please send a message consisting of the word "help" (quotes not included) in the BODY of a message to: "firstname.lastname@example.org". Mailing list problems should be reported to "email@example.com". All submissions included in this digest represent the views of the individual authors and all submissions will be considered to be distributable without limitations. The PRIVACY Forum archive, including all issues of the digest and all related materials, is available via anonymous FTP from site "ftp ftp.vortex.com", in the "/privacy" directory. Use the FTP login "ftp" or "anonymous", and enter your e-mail address as the password. The typical "README" and "INDEX" files are available to guide you through the files available for FTP access. PRIVACY Forum materials may also be obtained automatically via e-mail through the listserv system. Please follow the instructions above for getting the listserv "help" information, which includes details regarding the "index" and "get" listserv commands, which are used to access the PRIVACY Forum archive. All PRIVACY Forum materials are available through the Internet Gopher system via a gopher server on site "gopher.vortex.com/". Access to PRIVACY Forum materials is also available through the Internet World Wide Web (WWW) via the Vortex Technology WWW home page at the URL: "http://www.vortex.com/". For information regarding the availability of this digest via FAX, please send an inquiry to firstname.lastname@example.org, call (818) 225-2800, or FAX to (818) 225-7203. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- VOLUME 03, ISSUE 20 Quote for the day: "A scientist both wise and bold, set out to cure the common cold. Instead he found this power pill, which he said most certainly will, turn a lamb into a lion, like an eagle he'll be flyin'. Solid steel will be like putty. It will work on anybody!" -- From the opening theme of "Mr. Terrific" January 1967 - August 1967 (CBS) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat, 22 Oct 94 11:47 PDT From: email@example.com (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator) Subject: O.J. Simpson Trial Jury Questionnaires now in PRIVACY Forum Archive Greetings. The PRIVACY Forum has been sent several copies of the complete O.J. Simpson trial questionnaires, which have already been widely circulated in the mainstream media. These are the short "hardship" and longer full versions (in original printed form with space for answers, the longer version ran 75 pages). After some consideration, I've decided that the detailed and personal nature of the questions on these questionnaires (particularly the longer one) makes them a valid topic for discussion in this forum. Among the topics for possible consideration: -- How would you feel about answering these sorts of detailed, personal questions? Would you consider them to be an invasion of your privacy? An acceptable invasion? Unacceptable? -- If a potential juror was unwilling to answer any or all of these questions, would they or should they be subject to any sanctions? -- Do these sorts of detailed personal questions truly yield useful information to the opposing sides in trials? Can the answers be trusted to be honest? -- Does the use of personal inquiry questionnaires of this sort have an overall positive or negative impact on the legal system? -- And so on... To access the questionnaires, which are both in a single file which runs about 57K in length: Via Anon FTP: From site "ftp ftp.vortex.com": /privacy/simpson-jq.Z or: /privacy/simpson-jq Via e-mail: Send mail to "firstname.lastname@example.org" with the line: get privacy simpson-jq as the first text in the BODY of your message. Via gopher: From the gopher server on site "gopher.vortex.com/" in the "*** PRIVACY Forum ***" area under "simpson-jq". Via World Wide Web (WWW): Access the "PRIVACY Forum" archive via the Vortex Technology home page at URL: http://www.vortex.com/ --Lauren-- ------------------------------ Date: 8 Oct 1994 14:32:28 -0500 From: email@example.com (Stanton McCandlish) Subject: EFF Statement on Passage of Digital Telephony Act EFF Statement on and Analysis of Digital Telephony Act October 8, 1994 Washington, DC - Congress late Friday (10/7) passed and sent to the President the Edwards/Leahy Digital Telephony Legislation (HR 4922/S 2375). The bill places functional design requirements on telecommunications carriers in order to enable law enforcement to continue to conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to a court order, though the bill does not expand law enforcement authority to conduct wiretaps. Moreover, the design requirements do not apply to providers or operators of online services such as the Internet, BBS's, Compuserve, and others. The bill also contains significant new privacy protections, including increased protection for online personal information, and requirements prohibiting the use of pen registers to track the physical location of individuals. Jerry Berman, EFF's Policy Director, said: "Although we remain unconvinced that this legislation is necessary, the bill draws a hard line around the Internet and other online networks. We have carved cyberspace out of this legislation". Berman added, "The fact that the Internet, BBS's, Prodigy, and other online networks are not required to meet the surveillance capability requirements is a significant victory for all users of this important communications medium." Privacy Protections for Online Personal Information Increased The bill adds a higher standard for law enforcement access to online transactional information. For maintenance and billing purposes, most online communications and information systems create detailed records of users' communication activities as well as lists of the information, services, or people that they have accessed or contacted. Under current law, the government can gain access to such transactional records with a mere subpoena, which can be obtained without the intervention of a court. To address this issue, EFF pushed for the addition of stronger protections against indiscriminate access to online transactional records. Under the new protections, law enforcement must convince a court to issue an order based on a showing of "specific and articulable facts" which prove that the information sought would be relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. Berman said: "The new legal protections for transactional information are critical in that they recognize that these records are extremely sensitive and deserve a high degree of protection from casual law enforcement access. With these provisions, we have achieved for all online systems a significantly greater level of protection than exists today for any other form of electronic communication, including the telephone." EFF to Continue to Monitor Implementation Berman added: "There are numerous opportunities under this bill for public oversight and intervention to ensure that privacy is not short-changed. EFF will closely monitor the bill's implementation, and we stand ready to intervene if privacy is threatened." In the first four years, the government is required to reimburse carriers for all costs associated with meeting the design requirements of the bill. After four years, the government is required to reimburse carriers for all costs for enhancements that are not "reasonably achievable", as determined in a proceeding before the FCC. The FCC will determine who bears the costs in terms of the impact on privacy, costs to consumers, national security and public safety, the development of technology, and other factors. If the FCC determines that compliance is not reasonably achievable, the government will either be required to reimburse the carrier or consider it to be in compliance without modification. Berman said: "EFF is committed to making a case before the FCC, at the first possible opportunity, that government reimbursement is an essential back-stop against unnecessary or unwanted surveillance capabilities. If the government pays, it will have an incentive to prioritize, which will further enhance public accountability and protect privacy." EFF Decision to Work on Legislation Since 1992 EFF, in conjunction with the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group (a coalition of over 50 computer, communications, and public interest organizations and associations working on communications privacy issues, coordinated by EFF) has been successful at stopping a series of FBI Digital Telephony proposals, which would have forced communications companies to install wiretap capability into every communications medium. However, earlier this year, Senator Leahy and Rep. Edwards, who have helped to quash previous FBI proposals, concluded that passage of such a bill this year was inevitable. Leahy and Edwards stepped in to draft a narrow bill with strong privacy protections, and asked for EFF's help in the process. "By engaging in this process for the last several months," Berman noted, "we have been successful in helping to craft a proposal that is significantly improved over the FBI's original bill in terms of privacy, technology policy, and civil liberties, and have, in the process, added significant new privacy protections for users of communications networks. We commend Representative Edwards, Senator Leahy, and Representatives Boucher and Markey for standing up for civil liberties and pushing for strong privacy protections." The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a non-profit public interest organization dedicated to achieving the democratic potential of new communications technology and works to protect civil liberties in new digital environments. Other Privacy Protections Added by the Bill The bill also adds the following new privacy protections * The standard for law enforcement access to online transactional records is raised to require a court order instead of a mere subpoena. * No expansion of law enforcement authority to conduct electronic surveillance. * The bill recognizes a citizen's right to use encryption. * All authorized surveillance must be conducted with the affirmative intervention of the telecommunications carrier. Monitoring triggered remotely by law enforcement is prohibited. * Privacy advocates will be able to track law enforcement requests for surveillance capability, and expenditures for all surveillance capability and capacity added under this bill will be open to public scrutiny. * Privacy protections must be maintained in making new technologies conform to the requirements of the bill, and privacy advocates may intervene in the administrative standard setting process. * Information gleaned from pen register devices is limited to dialed number information only. Law enforcement may not receive location information. Analysis of and comments on major provisions of the bill: A. Key new privacy protections 1. Expanded protection for transactional records sought by law enforcement Senator Leahy and Rep. Edwards have agreed that law enforcement access to transactional records in online communication systems (everything from the Internet to AOL to hobbyist BBSs) threatens privacy rights because the records are personally identifiable, because they reveal the content of people's communications, and because the compilation of such records makes it easy for law enforcement to create a detailed picture of people's lives online. Based on this recognition, the draft bill contains the following provisions: i. Court order required for access to transactional records instead of mere subpoena In order to gain access to transactional records, such as a list of to whom a subject sent email, which online discussion group one subscribes to, or which movies you request on a pay-per view channel, law enforcement will have to prove to a court, by the showing of "specific and articulable facts" that the records requested are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. This means that the government may not request volumes of transactional records merely to see what it can find through traffic analysis. Rather, law enforcement will have to prove to a court that it has reason to believe that it will find some specific information that is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation in the records that it requests. With these provisions, we have achieved for all online systems, a significantly greater level of protection than currently exists for telephone toll records. The lists of telephone calls that are kept by local and long distance phone companies are available to law enforcement without any judicial intervention at all. Law enforcement gains access to hundreds of thousands of such telephone records each year, without a warrant and without even notice to the citizens involved. Court order protection will make it much more difficult for law enforcement to go on "fishing expeditions" through online transactional records, hoping to find evidence of a crime by accident. ii. Standard of proof much greater than for telephone toll records, but below that for content The most important change that these new provisions offer, is that law enforcement will (a) have to convince a judge that there is reason to look at a particular set of records, and (b) have to expend the time and energy necessary to have a US Attorney or DA actually present a case before a court. However, the burden or proof to be met by the government in such a proceeding is lower than required for access to the content of a communication. 2. New protection for location-specific information available in cellular, PCS and other advanced networks Much of the electronic surveillance conducted by law enforcement today involves gathering telephone dialing information through a device known as a pen register. Authority to attach pen registers is obtained merely by asserting that the information would be relevant to a criminal investigation. Courts have no authority to deny pen register requests. This legislation offers significant new limits on the use of pen register data. Under this bill, when law enforcement seeks pen register information from a carrier, the carrier is forbidden to deliver to law enforcement any information which would disclose the location or movement of the calling or called party. Cellular phone networks, PCS systems, and so-called "follow-me" services all store location information in their networks. This new limitation is a major safeguard which will prevent law enforcement from casually using mobile and intelligent communications services as nation-wide tracking systems. i. New limitations on "pen register" authority Law enforcement must use "technology reasonably available" to limit pen registers to the collection of calling number information only. Currently, law enforcement is able to capture not only the telephone number dialed, but also any other touch-tone digits dialed which reflect the user's interaction with an automated information service on the other end of the line, such as an automatic banking system or a voice-mail password. 3. Bill does not preclude use of encryption Unlike previous Digital Telephony proposals, this bill places no obligation on telecommunication carriers to decipher encrypted messages, unless the carrier actually holds the key. The bill in no way prohibits citizens from using encryption. 4. Automated remote monitoring precluded Law enforcement is specifically precluded from having automated, remote surveillance capability. Any electronic surveillance must be initiated by an employee of the telecommunications carrier. 5. Privacy considerations essential to development of new technology One of the requirements that telecommunications carriers must meet to be in compliance with the Act is that the wiretap access methods adopted must protect the privacy and security of each user's communication. If this requirement is not met, anyone may petition the FCC to have the wiretap access service be modified so that network security is maintained. So, the technology used to conduct wiretaps cannot also jeopardize the security of the network as a whole. If network-wide security problems arise because of wiretapping standards, then the standards can be overturned. 6. Increased Public Accountability All law enforcement requests for surveillance capability and capacity, as well as all expenditures paid by law enforcement to telecommunications carriers and all modifications made by carriers to comply with this bill, will be accountable to the public. The government is also required to pay for all upgrades, in both capability and capacity, in the first four years, and all costs after four years for incorporating the capability requirements in the costs for meeting those requirements are not 'reasonably achievable'. A determination of whether compliance after four years is reasonably achievable will be made by the FCC in an open and public proceeding. Government reimbursement for compliance costs will permit the public the opportunity to decide whether additional surveillance capability is necessary. In all, the reimbursement requirements combined with the reporting requirements and the open processes built in to this bill, law enforcement surveillance capability, capacity, and expenditures will be more accountable to the public than ever before. B. Draconian provisions softened In addition, the surveillance requirements imposed by the bill are not as far-reaching as the original FBI version. A number of procedural safeguards are added which seek to minimize the threatens to privacy, security, and innovation. Though the underlying premise of the Act is still cause for concern, these new limitations deserve attention: 1. Narrow Scope The bill explicitly excludes Internet providers, email systems, BBSs, and other online services. Unlike the bills previously proposed by the FBI, this bill is limited to local and long distance telephone companies, cellular and PCS providers, and other common carriers. 2. Open process with public right of intervention The public will have access to information about the implementation of the Act, including open access to all standards adopted in compliance with the Act, the details of how much wiretap capacity the government demands, and a detailed accounting of all federal money paid to carriers for modifications to their networks. Privacy groups, industry interests, and anyone else has a statutory right under this bill to challenge implementation steps taken by law enforcement if they threaten privacy or impede technology advancement. 3. Technical requirements standards developed by industry instead of the Attorney General All surveillance requirements are to be implemented according to standards developed by industry groups. The government is specifically precluded from forcing any particular technical standard, and all requirements are qualified by notions of economic and technical reasonableness. 4. Right to deploy untappable services Unlike the original FBI proposal, this bill recognizes that there may be services which are untappable, even with Herculean effort to accommodate surveillance needs. In provisions that still require some strengthening, the bill allows untappable services to be deployed if redesign is not economically or technically feasible. Background Information * The Bill: ftp ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94.bill gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony, digtel94.bill http.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94.bill All other files available from: ftp ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/Old/ gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/Old http.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/Old/ * EFF Analysis of Bill as Introduced: digtel94_analysis.eff * EFF Statement on Earlier 1994 Draft of Bill: digtel94_old_statement.eff * EFF Analysis of Earlier 1994 Draft: digtel94_draft_analysis.eff * EFF Statement on Announcement of 1994 Draft: digtel94.announce * EFF Statement on Announcement of 1993 Draft: digtel93.announce * Late 1993/Early 1994 Draft: digtel94_bill.draft * EFF Statement on 1992 Draft: digtel92_analysis.eff * EFF Statement on 1992 Draft: digtel92_opposition.announce * Late 1992 Draft: digtel92_bill.draft * Original 1992 Draft: digtel92_old_bill.draft For more information contact: Jerry Berman Policy Director <firstname.lastname@example.org> Jonah Seiger Project Coordinator <email@example.com> +1 202 347 5400 (voice) +1 202 393 5509 (fax) ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 13 Oct 1994 14:13:21 -0700 From: Phil Agre <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: Caller ID debate Caller ID (abbreviated CNID) is a technology that enables your telephone to digitally send its phone number to the telephone of anybody you call. Controversy about privacy issues in CNID has swirled for years, and the 10/13/94 New York Times has an article on the subject: Matthew L. Wald, A privacy debate over Caller ID plan, New York Times, 13 October 1994. The United States Federal Communications Commission recently proposed rules, due to go into effect in April, to create uniform CNID protocols across state lines. While the FCC plan does protect privacy in some ways, e.g., preventing a business that captures your phone number from selling it to others without your permission, it does not mandate per-line blocking, which is necessary if you never want to send out your phone number, or if you only want to send it out when you enter a special code. The article states clearly that the real reason for CNID is commercial. Privacy advocates have been saying this for years, and for a long time they have gotten patronizing lectures about how CNID is for residential use in catching harassing phone callers. But CNID is a poor way to catch harassing phone callers. Moreover, that single application wouldn't nearly make CNID profitable. The point is that CNID is a good way to let companies collect marketing information and automate service interactions. Which is fine. Hardly anybody opposes CNID outright. But in order for CNID to avoid inadvertently giving away the phone number of someone who is being stalked, or who otherwise needs to keep their number a secret, it needs a few simple features: * per-line blocking -- a simple, no-cost way to declare that this telephone should not send out its number when dialling * per-line unblocking -- a simple, no-cost way to declare that this telephone now should send out its number when dialling * per-call blocking -- a simple, no-cost way to declare that, regardless of whether this line is blocked, this particular call should not include the calling number * per-call unblocking -- a simple, no-cost way to declare that, regardless of whather this line is blocked, this particular call should include the calling number In order for people to get the benefit of these commands, some further rules are needed: * All four of these commands should be entered with different codes. * Most especially, the blocking and unblocking commands should not be implemented with toggle commands (for example, *67 blocks the line and then another *67 unblocks it -- or, wait!, did the first *67 unblock the line so that the next *67 blocked it?). * All of these commands (or at least the per-call ones) should take effect instantly, without requiring a pause before dialling a number, so that phone numbers stored in modems can include the codes. * All of the commands should be standardized everywhere. * All of the commands should be clearly and concisely explained in some convenient place in the phone book. If at all possible, the commands should be listed on a simple cue card that can be attached to the telephone alongside the emergency numbers. (Of course, if a telephone had a real user interface then cue cards would not be necessary.) Don't all of these rules sound like common sense? Of course they do. They allow everyone complete freedom of choice. If you like CNID then you can turn it on and forget about it. If you want to refuse calls that do not include caller numbers then you're free to do that. If you don't care to call anyone who requires a caller number then you're free to adopt that policy as well. If you never want to send out your number because you're being stalked or are running a shelter then you can do that. Free choice. So why do proponents of CNID go to extraordinary lengths to defeat these simple, ordinary protections? Because they're afraid that large numbers of people would use per-line blocking, thus making the system less attractive to the businesses who want to capture lots of phone numbers. Like many schemes for using personal information, then, CNID is founded on trickery -- that is, on the gathering and use of information without free choice, full informed consent, and convenient, easily understood mechanisms for opting out. You might ask, "doesn't per-call blocking alone provide the necessary choice?" No, it doesn't. Per-call blocking is like saying, "every single time you drive your car into a gas station, your car instantly becomes the property of the gas station unless you remember to say abracadabra before you start pumping your gas." In each case, the cards are stacked against your ability to maintain control over something of yours, whether your car or your information. What can you do? Write a letter to the FCC, with a copy to your state attorney general and public utilities commission and to your local newspaper. Send them the list of CNID commands I provided above. Spell it out for them, and provide answers for the obvious pro-CNID arguments. Your state regulators might even agree with you already, in which case they need your support. For more information, send a message that looks like this: To: email@example.com Subject: archive send cnid Or contact the organizations that are working on this issue: * Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, firstname.lastname@example.org * Electronic Privacy Information Center, email@example.com * Electronic Frontier Foundation, firstname.lastname@example.org Or start something of your own. The best way to predict the future, after all, is to create it yourself. Phil Agre, UCSD ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 29 Sep 1994 12:16:19 -700 (MDT) From: Jim Conforti <email@example.com> Subject: Electronic Signatures (Sears) No sooner than I saw the last blurbs about the signature digitzing pads, did I enter the local (Salt Lake City, UT) Sears ... Of course, I was given the opportunity to sign on the pad, and after a rather long conversation with the salesdroid, he accepted the slip without a digitization ... I then visited with the store manager, who informed me that the signature pad use was completely optional and that the salesdroids KNOW this fact and the combo of keys needed to bypass this function .. Forewarned is Forearmed Jim Conforti ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 5 Oct 1994 04:05:41 -0400 From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.COM> Subject: MCI Employee Charged in $50 Million Calling Card Fraud Excerpt from TELECOM Digest V14 #385 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 4 Oct 94 12:47:54 CDT From: firstname.lastname@example.org (Patrick Townson) Subject: MCI Employee Charged in $50 Million Calling Card Fraud Felony charges of access device fraud involving over one hundred thousand telephone calling cards -- mostly those of MCI customers but including cards of local telcos and in a few instances AT&T and Sprint have been filed against Ivy James Lay of Charlotte, NC. Lay, employed as a switch engineer by MCI in its Charlotte switching center until his arrest and indictment at the end of last week, is also known by his phreak name 'Knightshadow'. He was fired late last week when MCI concluded its investigation into his activities. According to Secret Service Special Agent Steven Sepulveda, Lay had installed special software in MCI switching equipment which trapped the calling card numbers and personal identification codes of callers. He then sold these stolen calling card numbers to other phreaks all over the USA and Europe. MCI claims that about one hundred thousand of its customers' calling cards have been compromised as a result. In addition, several thousand calling cards issued by AT&T, Sprint and/or local telephone companies have been compromised as a result of traffic from those carriers being routed for whatever reason through the MCI center in Charlotte. The dollar value of the fraud is estimated to be fifty million dollars by the Secret Service and MCI. Some of the fraud traffic occurred as recently as the last two weeks and has not yet been billed to customers. According to MCI and the federal indictment, Ivy James Lay is the leader of an international fraud ring operating in Los Angeles and several other US cities as well as Spain, Germany and the UK. The indictment claims he supplied stolen calling card numbers to phreaks all over the USA and other parts of the world. A spokesperson for the Secret Service called the case unprecedented in its sophisticated use of computers and the manner in which the fraud ring coordinated its activities on a global scale. MCI spokesperson Leslie Aun characterized the case as the largest of its kind in terms of known losses, both in dollar amount and number of customers who were victimized. Ms. Aun added that Ivy James Lay was immediatly fired once the joint investigation by MCI and the Secret Service was finished late last week. In raids conducted simultaneously at the homes of Mr. Lay and other co-conspirators last week, agents seized many items including six computers with pirated commercial copyrighted software and many boxes full of computer disks with thousands of calling card numbers on each. Telephone toll records of Mr. Lay and other phreaks involved in the scam have also been obtained showing examples of fraudulent traffic. Spokespersons for Sprint, AT&T and MCI are encouraging customers who believe their calling cards were compromised in the scam to contact the appropriate customer service department immediatly so their cards can be cancelled and re-issued. Customers should bear in mind that the vast majority of the fraud was against MCI customers whose traffic went through the Charlotte center. If convicted, 'Knightshadow' as he known to other phreaks and his co-conspirators face ten years in a federal penitentiary. It must be remembered that in the United States, our constitution requires a presumption of innocence on the part of Ivy James Lay and the other phreaks involved until their guilt is proven by the government in a court of law. ------------------- In certain other prominent e-journals on the Internet, we have read in recent days that computer crime is not nearly the serious matter the government claims it to be. It sounds to me like the sneak-thievery of a hundred thousand plus calling card numbers and fifty million dollars in phreak phone calls is serious enough. We have long known about telco employees who themselves are as corrupt as the day is long; who think nothing of taking bribes for providing confidential information about their employer and its customers. But most of it to-date has been petty ante stuff; a few dollars under the table for a non-pub phone number, or maybe a hackerphreak who gets a job with telco then uses information and technology at his (legitimate) disposal to cover his own tracks where obscene/harassing calls are concerned. But a hundred thousand calling cards and fifty million dollars in traffic???? At what point are certain publishers/editors on the Internet going to wake up? Computer crime is growing expotentially. I think it is time to have another massive crackdown, similar to Operation Sun Devil a few years ago. Let's start getting really tough on hackers and phreaks. Patrick Townson ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 6 Oct 1994 06:12:05 -0700 (PDT) From: Carey Heckman <ceh@leland.Stanford.EDU> Subject: Call for Participation - CFP'95 Call for Participation - CFP'95 The Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy Sponsored by the ACM SIGCOMM, SIGCAS, SIGSAC and Stanford Law School 28 - 31 March 1995 San Francisco Airport Marriott Hotel, Burlingame, California INVITATION This is an invitation to submit session and topic proposals for inclusion in the program of the Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy. Proposals may be for individual talks, panel discussions, debates, or other presentations in appropriate formats. Proposed topics should be within the general scope of the conference, as outlined below. SCOPE The advance of computer and telecommunications technologies holds great promise for individuals and society. From convenience for consumers and efficiency in commerce to improved public health and safety and increased participation in democratic institutions, these technologies can fundamentally transform our lives. New computer and telecommunications technologies are bringing new meanings to our freedoms to speak, associate, be left alone, learn, and exercise political power. At the same time these technologies pose threats to the ideals of a just, free, and open society. Personal privacy is increasingly at risk from invasion by high-tech surveillance and eavesdropping. The myriad databases containing personal information maintained in the public and private sectors expose private life to constant scrutiny. Political, social, and economic fairness may hinge on ensuring equal access to these technologies, but how, at what cost, and who will pay? Technological advances also enable new forms of illegal activity, posing new problems for legal and law enforcement officials and challenging the very definitions of crime and civil liberties. But technologies used to combat these crimes can threaten the traditional barriers between the individual and the state. Even such fundamental notions as speech, assembly and property are being transformed by these technologies, throwing into question the basic Constitutional protections that have guarded them. Similarly, information knows no borders; as the scope of economies becomes global and as networked communities transcend international boundaries, ways must be found to reconcile competing political, social, and economic interests in the digital domain. The Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy will assemble experts, advocates and interested people from a broad spectrum of disciplines and backgrounds in a balanced public forum to explore and better understand how computer and telecommunications technologies are affecting freedom and privacy in society. Participants will include people from the fields of computer science, law, business, research, information, library science, health, public policy, government, law enforcement, public advocacy, and many others. Topics covered in previous CFP conferences include: Personal Information and Privacy Access to Government Information Computers in the Workplace Electronic Speech, Press and Assembly Governance of Cyberspace Role of Libraries on the Information Superhighway Law Enforcement and Civil Liberties Privacy and Cryptography Free Speech and the Public Communications Network We are also actively seeking proposals with respect to other possible topics on the general subject of computers, freedom and privacy. Some new topics we are considering include: Telecommuting: Liberation or Exploitation? Courtesy, and the Freedom to be Obnoxious Commercial Life on the Net How Does the Net Threaten Government Power? Universal Access to Network Services The Meaning of Freedom in the Computer Age Online Interaction and Communities Government-Mandated Databases PROPOSAL SUBMISSION All proposals should be accompanied by a position statement of at least one page, describing the proposed topic. Proposals for panel discussions, debates and other multi-person presentations should include a list of proposed participants and session chair. Proposals should be sent to: CFP'95 Proposals Stanford Law and Technology Policy Center Stanford Law School Stanford, California 94305-8610 or by email to: email@example.com with the word RProposalS in the subject line. Proposals should be submitted as soon as possible to allow thorough consideration for inclusion in the formal program. The deadline for submissions is 1 November 1994. STUDENT PAPER COMPETITION Full time students are invited to enter the student paper competition. Winners will receive a scholarship to attend the conference and present their papers. Papers should not exceed 2,500 words and should examine how computer and telecommunications technologies are affecting freedom and privacy in society. All papers should be submitted to Professor Gary T. Marx by 20 November 1994. Authors may submit their papers either by sending them as straight text via email to: Gary.Marx@colorado.edu or by sending six printed copies to: Professor Gary T. Marx University of Colorado Campus Box 327 Boulder, Colorado 80309-0327 (303) 492-1697 Submitters should include the name of their institution, degree program, and a signed statement affirming that they are a full-time student at their institution and that the paper is an original, unpublished work of their own. INFORMATION For more information on the CFP'95 program and advance registration, as it becomes available, write to: CFP'95 Information Stanford Law and Technology Policy Center Stanford Law School Stanford, California 94305-8610 or send email to: firstname.lastname@example.org with the word "Information" in the subject line. THE ORGANIZERS General Chair -------------- Carey Heckman Stanford Law School Stanford Law & Technology Policy Center Stanford, CA 94305-8610 415-725-7788 (voice) 415-725-1861 (fax) email@example.com To discuss potential CFP'95 speakers, topics, and formats, and to receive additional CFP'95 information, subscribe to the CFP95 list. Send to firstname.lastname@example.org a plain text message consisting of subscribe cfp95. Program Committee --------------------- Sheri Alpert Internal Revenue Service Judi Clark ManyMedia Kaye Caldwell Software Industry Coalition Esther Dyson EDventure Holdings Mike Godwin Electronic Frontier Foundation Peter Harter National Public Telecommuting Network Lance J. Hoffman George Washington University Ellen Kirsh America OnLine Bruce R. Koball Motion West Gary T. Marx University of Colorado Mitch Ratcliffe Digital Week Marc Rotenberg Electronic Privacy Information Center Deborah Runkle American Association for the Advancement of Science Barbara Simons USACM Ross Stapleton-Gray Georgetown University Glenn Tenney Fantasia Systems Jeff Ubois Author and Consultant J. Kent Walker, Jr. Department of Justice Affiliations are listed for identification. ---- Please distribute and post this notice! Professor Lance J. Hoffman Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science The George Washington University (202) 994-4955 Fax: (202) 994-0227 Washington, D. C. 20052 email@example.com ------------------------------ End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 03.20 ************************
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